A web of intercorrelations: culture, financial reporting and social output by Dima, Bogdan & Cristea, Stefana Maria
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A web of intercorrelations: culture,
financial reporting and social output
Bogdan Dima and Stefana Maria Cristea
12. April 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8246/
MPRA Paper No. 8246, posted 13. April 2008 00:27 UTC
 
 
A WEB OF INTERCORRELATIONS: CULTURE, FINANCIAL REPORTING  
AND SOCIAL OUTPUT  
 
 
Bogdan DIMA, PhD Professor, West University, Timişoara 
Telephone no.: +40720724197  
E-mail address: bogdandima2001@gmail.com 
 
Ştefana CRISTEA, PhD, Lucian Blaga University, Sibiu 
Telephone no.: +40751897825 
E-mail address: stefana_cristea@yahoo.it 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
In the context of a growing literature on the connection between cultural variables and accounting regulations, the 
general objective of the paper is to provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence on the recent trends in 
financial reporting and on their impact on the dynamics of the social output. Thus, the specific objectives are: 1) to 
provide an operational definition of culture; 2) to advance a model of the interactions between culture, design of 
accounting regulations and the economic growth; 3) to test some of these interactions at the European based on an 
empirical pool data model. The dependent variable are: a dummy aiming to capture the specificity of the IFRSs 
endorsement in EU; the average real GDP rates of growth; and the explanatory variables which are represented by 
the cultural descriptors derived from World Values Survey questions. The main results of the paper consist in the 
following theses: the culture is relevant for the national characteristics of IFRSs implementation in European Union; 
and the accounting framework matters for the outcomes of social decisions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Starting with the seminal work of Harrison & McKinnon (1986) and Gray (1988), a growing literature 
addresses the issue of the connections between the cultural variables and the accounting regulations and 
tries to explain and predict by using such variables the international differences in accounting systems. 
Several studies have tested Gray's hypothesis including Pourjalali & Meek (1995) who identifies a match 
between changes in cultural dimensions and the accounting environment in Iran following the revolution. 
On the other hand, Amat, Blake, Wraith & Oliveras (1999) link the national culture to the characteristics 
of the Spanish accounting environment. Also, Dunn (2002) concludes that cultural and political barriers 
are some of the most important limitative factors for the international accounting harmonization. 
 
Meanwhile, there is a significant literature dealing with the situations of “imperfect information” and its 
consequences on the quality of decisional act. Since the introduction of the “bounded rationality” concept 
initiated in the ‘50s by Herbert Simon, several works have taken into account both the economic 
implications of this decision-making mechanism and the difficulties to describe it. This literature has 
discussed the “procedural rationality”, knowledge, memory, choice of what to know, and group decisions 
by challenging the dominant paradigm of the “rational” decision-making process (“have raised great 
doubts as to whether this schematized model of economic man provides a suitable foundation on which to 
erect a theory - whether it be a theory of how firms do behave or of how they 'should' rationally behave”, 
Rubinstein, 1998; 16).  
 
Thus, the general objective of this paper is to provide a simple theoretical framework and some empirical 
evidence within the fervent debate over the recent evolution in European countries’ financial reporting. 
The paper is organized as it follows: Section 1 provides a general framework of the decisional 
determinants of IFRSs adoption together with an operational definition of culture - as the dominant 
collective mental model that individualizes a society from another by being the subject of a learning and 
inter-generational transmission process - along with an analysis of the impact of IFRSs adoption status on 
the social output. Moreover, this section identifies some particularities of the accounting regulations in 
the European Union which make the general conceptual background a feasible descriptor; Section 2 tries 
to provide an empirical support for the thesis that there are some significant connections between the 
characteristics of the cultural paradigm and the financial reporting in the European Union and also for 
the connections between the impact of financial reporting on the social output dynamics via the quality of 
the informational social system;  Section 3 includes derived comments and (auto) critics. 
 
Therefore, the main results of the paper consist in the theses that the culture matters in explaining the 
national characteristics of the accounting standards’ implementation whereas the accounting framework 
matters for the outcomes of social decisions.  
 
1. THE CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
The European accountancy undertakes the most significant revolution since the issuance of the IVth 
Directive in 1978. Since 2005, IAS Regulation (Regulation No.1606/2002/EC) has required European 
companies listed in a European securities market to use International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRSs) for the preparation of their consolidated financial statements. This requirement 
affects almost 8000 European listed companies. In addition, Article 5 of the IAS Regulation allows 
Member States to permit or require the unlisted entities to draw up their individual and consolidated 
accounts according to IAS.   
 
In order to provide an auto-consistent explanation for the different countries’ decisions to adopt or 
converge with IFRSs, it is minimally necessary: 1) to provide a general framework of regulations 
adoption by different authorities; 2) to identify the particularities of the IFRSs adoption mechanisms 
susceptible to allows the usage of this framework. 
 
1.1. A framework of the regulations adoption 
 
The manner in which a formal public, semi-public or private authority adopts different regulations 
depends on a complex set of “objective” and “subjective” determinants originating from economic, social 
and psychological fields. Of course, it could be simply argued that a certain set of regulations will be 
adopted if such process leads to attain at least a “second best” state. But this sounds a little bit like 
“Hamlet without the prince of Denmark”. While the “hard” economic factors were analyzed in a large 
number of studies, less attention was paid to the “psychic” motivations of the regulatory mechanism. In 
fact, each authority acts based on a social mandate. Or, one could observe that the nature of the social 
contract is critical for the soundness of the entire proposed argumentation. As Hirshleifer (2001: 126) 
notices: “It is useful to distinguish vertical from horizontal social contracts. The vertical alternative, 
Thomas Hobbes’s version, would be represented by arrangements such as hierarchical in the biological 
realm or dictatorship on the human level. John Locke’s version, the horizontal alternative, corresponds to 
more egalitarian arrangements in either sphere”. Each of such arrangements will generate different costs 
of imposing/supervising/punishing the non-followers for a given set of regulations. 
 
For the development of the analytical framework, it is useful to distinguish between objective and, 
respectively, subjective costs of the regulatory process. We admit it is difficult to ex ante discriminate 
between these types of costs and also between their individual components. However, in general terms, 
such costs could be described as: 
• Objective costs involves material, human capital and financial resources, infrastructure, time and 
information necessary to apply, supervise and punish the non-observance of one or more regulations; 
• Subjective costs are linked both to the internal as well as external involved authority’s environments. 
Usually, these are institutional costs generated by the perception of how the adopted regulations will 
affect the authority’s output. 
Both categories of costs could be “variables” (“time-depending) or “fix” (“constant over a given time 
period”). Also both of them could take a quantifiable form or could be perceive in a “fuzzy” “low”/ 
“high” form. Finally, both of them could be connected to the authority’s capacity to fulfill its social 
mandate. 
 
It may be observed that the existence of the subjective costs raises an “aggregation problem”: if some 
“micro” psychological factors could at a certain extent explain the adoption of a particular set of 
regulations, it is necessary to extent such determinants at a “macro” level in order to systematically 
explains different authorities’ decisions on the “long-run”. Or, in other words, it is necessary to take into 
account the cultural paradigm in which these authorities operate as an “aggregate” of their individual set 
of values and “subjective” motivations.  
 
Also it could be perceived that both types of costs are depending inter alia on the volume, structure and 
quality of the available information: if the deciding authority is able to collect and manage a 
corresponding amount of current and relevant information, then it will be able to make decisions implying 
lower decisional costs. But with the exception of the “perfect information” situations, there have always 
been involved some corresponding informational costs. As a consequence, it will be necessary to have a 
corresponding balance for the “excess output” induced by a better informational mechanism and also for 
the “costs saving” with the aggregate informational costs implied by the design and function of such 
mechanism. 
 
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, culture is “the act of developing by education, discipline, 
and social experience” or “training or refining of the moral and intellectual faculties”. In a different view, 
Cozzi (1998) understands by culture a “social asset” whose acquisition by an agent generates no 
individual utility but has positive external effects. UNESCO (1992)i had described culture as follows: "... 
culture should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features 
of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of 
living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs". Such definitions are more focused on the static 
aspects of the culture as given social artifacts. But cultural characteristic are changing over time; the 
content of the shared intellectual products does not rest the same over long time spans. Societies are 
reacting to the variation of the external and internal environment. So that, a more comprehensive view of 
cultural paradigm admits that its architecture is “stable” only in a “short enough” time horizon.  
 
However, we agree with the definition of paradigm provided by Talpoş et al. (2005: 20) <<Through 
paradigm we understand the dominant collective mental model that individualizes a society from another. 
This paradigm represents a societal integration factor, by offering common values and goals for the 
members of the society. Also, this represents the subject of some learning and inter-generational 
transmission process, which slowly modifies itself, in “long cycles”>>.  
 
Hence, we consider the cultural paradigm as representing “something much more” then a set of “shared 
values”. This way, one could remark that an interesting definition for the culture as “shared values” is 
given by Kroeber & Kluckhohn (1952) (cited in Adler, 1986). According to them, culture consist of 
patterns, explicit and implicit of and for behaviors acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the 
distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of 
culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached 
values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered products of action, on the other conditioning 
elements of future action. 
 
In consequence, culture is: 
♦ Something that is shared by all or almost all members of some social group; 
♦ Something that the older members of the group try to pass on to the younger members; and, 
♦ Something (as in the case of morals, laws and customs) that shapes behavior, or structures one’s 
perception of the world. 
Our vision is much closer to Hofstede (1991) who defines culture as “the collective programming of the 
mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another”. Like him, we 
emphasize that culture is, at least partially, learned, and not only inherited. Supplementary, it is useful to 
understand by culture a “relational product” generated in the interactions between the social entities and 
their micro and macro environment. Or, according to Trompenaars & Woolliams (2003: 21) “Culture is 
rather the contextual environment, defining much of the essence of the relationships between an 
organization and the environment in which it operates”.  
 
A critical consequence of the culture consists in the fact that it modulates the way in which the decisional 
mechanisms work. The decisional authority is not “neutral” in respect to a certain informational set: 
according to its own paradigm, the usage of the information, the relative informational weight and the 
estimated importance of certain information  are decided based on the cultural variables such as “time 
perspective”, “uncertainty avoidance”, “performance focused decisions” or “social justice in resources 
allocation”. 
 
Overall, this conceptual framework could be described as in Figure 1, where are presented three main 
categories of functional connections: 
(1) the linkage between financial reporting (FR) and the informational structure and the output dynamic 
via the quality of  the information generated by FR and implicitly by the decisional quality; 
(2) the linkage between the configuration of the cultural variables and the status of financial reporting; 
(3) the linkage between the cultural paradigm and the output dynamic via the configuration of the 
information management system and the information usage and its subjective importance. 
 
Figure 1: Information, culture and the decisional output 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With these features, a compact model of the regulation mechanisms could be formally described as: 
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Where 
ti
r is a state variable which describes the regulatory conditions for a certain issue i in the current 
period t, I* is an output index describing the results in the presence of the regulations as I status for the 
output index in the absence of such regulations, ka are the current adoption costs for the regulatory set as k 
describes the imposing/supervising/punishing costs. C is a set of cultural variables characteristics for the 
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paradigm, F is an informational index described to capture the amount, structure and relevance of the 
information from the past and current periods as well as anticipated to be obtain in the next period, z are 
the corresponding informational costs for past, current and future periods, ε is a “black box” which 
counts for the influence of other “hidden” variables and λ1 , λ2  ,λ3  ,λ4  are the relative sensitivity 
coefficients. 
 
We assuming that I* could be written as: 
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where β is a discount factor, φI  is a state effect that captures the role played by “fix” elements able to 
affect the regulations’ impact and ηI measures the “omitted” specific factors. As a further step, we 
suppose that the expected future output could be predicted inside a mix mechanism by incorporating both 
past and current valuesii: ( ) ( ) ( )3
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where L is the lag operator. 
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with φk  the “fix” component of maintaining the regulations and 
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Since cultural variables adjust in “long cycle”, it is possible to consider under a “short enough” time 
period that: ( ) ( )10
tt iit
CCE ≈  
Finally, if ε is a random exogenous shock then 
( ) ( )110=ttE ε  
Relations (1) - (11) could be combined in order to obtain the result from the relation (12). Relation (12) 
describes a general framework for the adoption of a regulations’ set. A particular case is represented by 
the situation in which the authority that should decide on a certain topic i is not unique in a given / 
different social space. More exactly, if there is more than one authority to decide then the individual 
output could (if certain conditions are fulfilled)iii depend not only on the intrinsic connections between the 
regulations and their effects but also on the extrinsic correlations with the other authorities’ output. 
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It could be noticed that such thesis could be valid even in the situation of a weak linkage between the 
involved authorities but generally it stands in a higher interdependence context. If this is taken into 
account then the relation (12) should be rewrite as: 
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where the superscript e denotes the differential between two authorities X,Y output. 
 
It could be observed that: 
• The relation (12.1.) takes into account only the output differential: there is not objective costs’ linkage 
between authority’s regulatory measures. The main reason for such approach consists in the fact that 
such linkage must be explained under a supplementary set of conditions with adequate descriptions of 
the costs transfer/contamination mechanisms which are far to be trivial ones. So that, for the sake of 
the simplicity, this extension is ignored; 
• The relation does not account for cultural differential: the subjective costs are supposed to not be 
interrelated. Since each authority operates inside its own paradigm, the analytical price of such 
simplification is apparently low. But in fact there could be some important cultural values transfers so 
that the isolation of the cultural impact on regulatory processes is susceptible to affect the description 
realism. The only possible counter-argument consists in the thesis of the “long-run” viability of the 
transfer mechanisms and complementary the postulation of their non-efficiency on a “short” time 
frame; 
• The relation does not account for informational differential: it is supposed that there is not an 
information exchange between the authorities and / or an institutional specialization in the process of 
information gathering and usage. In other words, the involved authorities are seen working in an 
“informational autonomy”. Such an hypothesis is more than debatable and could hold only for the 
“pure internal” regulatory decisions; 
• Finally, there is supposed no connection between the “fix” components of the outputs and costs. If 
such components are supposed to have especially an institutional nature, the “long-run” argument 
holds and such approach is consistent with the previous observations. 
   
The relation (12.1.) permits to establish the conditions in which an authority will adopt regulatory 
measures on a certain topic: this will happen as long as the “net” output of such measures will be positive 
or: 
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According to relation (13): 
P0: In caeteris paribus conditions, an authority will adopt regulatory measures if the “excess” ”fix” and 
“variable” output of such measures as well as the influence of the “omitted” factors over the output 
observed in a certain past period in absence of regulations will exceed the “objectives” current and 
future “fix” and “variable” adopting/imposing costs weighted with their relative sensitivity.  
P1: In caeteris paribus conditions, an authority will adopt regulatory measures if the “excess” ”fix” and 
“variable” output of such measures as well as the influence of the “omitted” factors  over the output 
observed in a certain past period in absence of regulations will exceed the “subjective” current costs 
reflected by the cultural paradigm weighted with their relative sensitivity.  
P2: In caeteris paribus conditions, an authority will adopt regulatory measures if the “excess” ”fix” and 
“variable” output of such measures as well as the influence of the “omitted” factors  over the output 
observed in a certain past period in absence of regulations will exceed the “net” current informational  
costs (the “brut” informational costs corrected with the “excess” of the output generated by the amount, 
structure and relevance of the available information)  reflected weighted with their relative sensitivity.  
Also it could be noticed that P3: the “net” output in the presence of the regulations will depend on the 
regulatory conditions status, “objectives” current and future “fix” and “variable” adopting/imposing 
costs weighted with their relative sensitivity, “subjective” current costs and “net” current informational  
costs: 
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1.2. The particularities of IFRS implementation 
 
There is no doubt that exist a direct connection between international accounting harmonization and 
globalization. The first concept could be perceived as an internationalization of accounting by promoting 
accounting standards in which the global interest prevails in front of the national one (Volker, 2000; 
Cooke, 2001). The evolutions of a more and more real and nominal integrated global economy, the 
changes in the architecture of the international financial system, the predominance of the multinational 
firms, the consequences of technological and informational transfers, all these requires an increased 
harmonization of the accounting practices. Thus, IFRSs arise as a product of the globalization forces, 
becoming the best choice for many national authorities in ensuring transparency and comparability of the 
financial information. The main reason for this consists in the fact that a “symbolic economy” implies 
uniform mechanisms for efficiency estimation since the economic subjects are in a certain sense 
“detached” from the objects of their decisions. Or, in other words, “abstract” economic relationships are 
based on uniform, regular and non-specific mechanisms to obtain the relevant information for the 
“benefits / looses” analysis.  
 
In order to fulfill this task, there became obvious that a choice must be made between US GAAPs and, 
respectively, IAS/IFRSs. But, in the last decade, IFRSs gained a widely acceptance so that almost 110 
countries around the world have adopted them in the issued form or with different modifications / 
limitations. In this context, FASB and IASB are determined to find a mutual compromise of adopting 
compatible and high quality solutions for present and future accounting issues. For this purpose, two 
memorandums of understanding were signed during the years (2002 – Norwalk Agreement; 2006). Still, 
the convergence process is far to be completely and there is not a clear short run perspective for a single 
international set of standards compatible with both sets of standards. 
 
For the proposed analysis, the critical point consists in the identification of IFRSs’ main characteristics, 
which will allow the application of the general decisional model advanced in the previous subsection. A 
brief analysis of the standards highlights that IFRSs are: 
• A formal set of regulations with a clearly structural internal organization of the information and a 
uniform prescription of the accounting treatments to be applied; 
• A “multi-authority” decisional result since a large number of bodies is involved (IASC  Foundation 
that names the members of the Board and IFRIC, IASB which issues the standards, IFRIC 
responsible with the issuance of standards’ interpretations, SAC which provides advisory support – all 
these being separate but interlinked structures; the European Commission with its entire network of 
bodies with analysis and advisory duties – EFRAG, TEG, SARG, ARC, Contact Committee, 
roundtable; the national regulators and so on); 
• A product of a specific cultural and business environment - the Anglo-Saxon one - destined to be 
assimilated in various other environments characterized by different cultural paradigms. 
Also: 
• The IFRSs appliance is susceptible to generate both objective / subjective outputs (in terms of an 
increased informational efficiency of financial statements, a more comprehensive decisional sources 
and a coherent support for the international placements of financial resources) and costs (material, 
human capital and institutional ones). However, the “costs / benefits” matrix should be carefully 
judge: the advantages of the increase reliability of international financial information, the better 
adequacy of the codified standards in the accounting and auditing fields, the contribution to the raise 
of direct / capital foreign flows of investments, the improvements of the fiscal systems in terms of 
social resources (re)distribution processes and the increase of international financial markets liquidity 
are balanced by the important differences between the national accounting practice which requires 
significant resources to fill the gaps, the lack of specialized professional accountancy bodies for some 
countries and the importance of socio-economic architecture particularities for different countries; 
• As is defined in Art. 1 of the Regulation No.1606/2002/EC, the IFRSs’ purpose is “harmonizing the 
financial information presented by the companies… in order to ensure a high degree of transparency 
and comparability of financial statements and hence an efficient functioning of the Community capital 
market and of the Internal Market”. So that, it could be considered that this regulation concerns the 
informational quality of the financial statements and its appliance is able to generate an “output 
differential” both at a micro as well at a macro level; 
• The IFRSs appliance is a “work in progress” under a significant time horizon so that there are some 
limitations of the “short-run” argument. 
 
If these postulates stand, then it could be concluded that the general decisional framework is also 
applicable for the IFRSs. However, it should be noted that in the particular case of the European Union a 
discriminate analysis is applicable only for domestic unlisted companies since all the listed companies are 
required to use the IFRSs. 
 
2. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S CASE 
The P1 , P3  propositions could be empirically tested in order to provide some support for the existence of 
some connections between the characteristics of the cultural paradigm and the implementation of the 
IFRSs in the European Union. The purpose of this section is to advance a brief description of an adequate 
testing strategy. 
 
Minimally, such a strategy implies the next stages: 
1. The construction of a fuzzy score variable able to capture the “permitted / required” adoption of the 
domestic unlisted companies IFRSs. A possible codification system for the construction of this 
variable is presented in Table 1. This variable takes values in a scale between “0” (meaning that the 
usage of IFRSs is prohibited both for individual and consolidated financial statements) and “2” 
(which reflects the situation of IFRSs requirement). The main statistical characteristics of the pool 
data constructed base on the individual values for the EU countries are displayed in Table 4. It could 
be observed that data tends to be concentrated in two main subgroups - first with value “1” which 
counts for 37.5% of the cases and second with value “1.5” representing 45.9% of the cases. This two 
groups reflects the corresponding combinations of “permitted / prohibited” and respectively 
“permitted / permitted” for the IFRSs adoption status. There are also two “extreme” values of “0” 
(prohibited / prohibited) for the cases of Latvia and Lithuania as well as two “extreme” values of “2” 
(required / required) for Malta and Slovakia. These “extreme” values count for 16.6% of the cases.   
2. The selection of the relevant components of the paradigm. It could be noticed that in the literature 
the variables are usually deduced from Hofstede (1980) in order to explain the cultural differences 
between the countries from the data analysis set (eventually by taking into account some limitation in 
their sphere and content). But one of the most sensitive characteristics in the present analysis of these 
variables consists in the fact that they are too general to address the particular issue of IFRSs. An 
alternative approach consists in taking into account some of the variables defined by the questions 
included in World Values Surveys. As Inglehart (2008) notes: “The World Values Surveys were 
designed to provide a comprehensive measurement of all major areas of human concern, from 
religion to politics to economic and social life and two dimensions dominate the picture: (1) 
Traditional / Secular-rational and (2) Survival / Self-expression values. .. The Traditional/ Secular-
rational values dimension reflects the contrast between societies in which religion is very important 
and those in which it is not. The second major dimension of cross-cultural variation is linked with the 
transition from industrial society to post-industrial societies-which brings a polarization between 
Survival and Self-expression values”. The selected questions are described in Table 2. These 
questions are linked with work valorization and ethic, freedom of decisions at “macro” and “micro” 
level, the “moral entitlement” of social (re)distributions processes and an social auto-referential 
about the norms and rules obedience. The involved values are extracted from 1999/2000 waves of 
surveyiv. 
3. The test of the connections between the score variable and the answers to the mentioned questions as 
a proxy for some empirical support of P1.  
4. The test between the dynamics of the output and the configuration of the score variable (between the 
regulations status and its results). The output is considered at a macro level as the average of the real 
GDP growth rate for 2001-2006. Such choice is designed to provide a more smooth proxy for the 
output by “cutting off” possible “jumps” in output caused by exogenous factors.    
 
The “stem-and-leaf” plots (not presented in the paper due to size limitations) indicate that in general 
terms the median values of score variable are associated with median values of the considered cultural 
variables and correlatively its “extreme” values appears in the presence of particularly high / low values 
for those. 
 
The pool data regressions reported in Table 5 suggest that: 
• All the cultural variables are positive and statistical significant associated with the score variable; 
• The strongest explanatory cultural variables are in terms of the t-test the questions concerning the 
support for following the regulation and the non-justifiable character of obtaining “un-entitled” 
benefits from public resources and to commit “illegal” tax evasion. In other words, C0 : If a society 
has a strong “legalist” architecture of  the paradigm (a strong tendency to formalize the rules of the 
“social game”) it will tend to require the adoption of the IFRSs  for the domestic unlisted companies 
both at the level of individual as well as at the consolidate financial statements. 
• At a second level, a large capacity to explain the structure of the score variable is associated with the 
social importance of work. So that, C1 : If a society has a strong “work ethic” it will tend to require 
the adoption of the IFRSs. 
• Three variables with a similar nature, a low level of freedom of choice and control of social subjects 
actions and, respectively, a low level of individual initiative both at the general social level as well as 
inside the work processes explain the adoption of regulations in this matter. C2 : If a society has a 
more “rigid” system of hierarchical social structures” it will tend to require the adoption of the 
IFRSs. 
• Correlatively, the variables linked with the perception of the social behavior in terms of “un-entitled” 
benefits from public resources and “illegal” tax evasion has the weakest explanatory capacity. Or, C3: 
The auto-referential perception of a society about the capacity of its own members to respect the 
regulations influence less the process of the IFRSs adoption. 
 
In addition, in accordance with results reported in Table 6: 
• The status of IFRSs adoption is positive and strongly statistical significant associated with the 
economic evolution; 
• Cultural variables are positive and statistical significant associated with GDP dynamics. The highest 
explanatory capacity is associated with a larger importance of freedom of choice and control of social 
subjects’ actions: the societies focused more on individual autonomy and on individual initiative 
benefit from a stronger economic development. Or, in other words, C4: The social output will be 
higher in the societies with a more “flexible” system of hierarchical social structures; 
• Interesting enough, the work over valorization and the strong legalist structure seems to constitute a 
second group of explanatory factors for the economic growth. So that, C5 : If a society has a strong 
“legalist” architecture of  the paradigm and also a strong “work ethic” it will benefit from a more 
suitable evolution of social output ; 
• As in the case of IFRSs, the lowest explanatory importance is connected to the perception regarding 
the “right” behavior in terms of “un-entitled” benefits from public resources and “illegal” tax evasion. 
As a consequence, C6: The auto-referential perception of a society about the capacity of its own 
members to respect the regulations influence less the economic dynamics. 
 
The C0 – C3 findings could be grouped in a single one as follows: C: As a society is placed in the area of 
the “semi-open” of the societal spectrum (as it have a preference for clearly and extended formal 
formulation of the social rules, with a strong work ethic and with more rigid hierarchical social 
structures and with a higher preference for the “moral” distribution/redistribution of the social resources 
processes) it will tend more to require the adoption of IFRSs for the domestic unlisted companies. 
Furthermore, the C4 – C6  findings could be grouped as: O: As a society is placed in the area of the “open 
societies” (as it have a preference for clearly and extended formal formulation of the social rules, with a 
strong work ethic but with less rigid hierarchical social structures and with a higher preference for the 
“moral” distribution / redistribution of the social resources processes) it will benefit from a better 
evolution of the social output. 
 
It could be noticed that these findings could be interlinked. For instance, taking into account their 
different combinations, it could be predicted that the influence of the IFRSs adoption status on the social 
dynamic output will be: 
 
 C0 C1 C2 C3 
C4 Undecided Undecided Low Undecided 
C5 Higher Higher Undecided Undecided 
C6 Undecided Undecided Undecided Low 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results presented in the previous section are quite puzzling. On one hand, the image drawn by the 
cultural variables is consistent: at a “median” level the cultural variables and the characteristics of the 
regulatory set for the IFRSs adoption are significant linked. On the other hand, there are no mechanisms 
to discriminate between the autonomous national decisions and the influence of the extra-national 
involved bodies. Also, the most “liberal” societies, in terms of individual autonomy but with a stronger 
focus on respecting the “rules of the social game”, tend to benefit more from the economic dynamics. 
More generally, the proposed analysis is affected by some important limitations both at the theoretical as 
well as at the empirical level. Among these limitations, one could note: 
 
3.1. Theoretical “white spots” 
 
1) Culture and individual utility function: what is the connection? 
The core argument of this paper is that the social subjects are not “perfectly rational” so that they adopt 
their decisions (including the decision to regulate on a certain topic) also under the influence of a certain 
set of psychological factors. The aggregate reflection of such factors is “culture” so that the set of social 
norms, rules and regulations will be affected by it. But such approach is more an ex post one since it 
implies two rounds of aggregation: one for individual migration decisions and one for the subjective 
variables. Even more no description of such aggregation mechanism is provided and is not clearly why a 
“synthetic” macro-view is possible. 
2) How could be “culture” measured? 
The appeal to the Hofstede’s cultural variables could be criticized due to the fact that these have 
obviously a certain self-referential in the “occidental” culture and are not able to sustain a more accurate 
distinction between the characteristics of the cultural artifacts. But isn’t the same situation for the World 
Values Surveys variables? In our opinion, the fact that the questions are based on a “valorization 
approach” for some universal human values, addresses at least partially this issue. 
3) Where are the inter-generational mechanisms? 
If “we emphasize that culture is, at least partially, learned, and not only inherited” than, at least on “long 
run” the relation (8.1.) does not stands anymore and the general decisional model should provide a 
description of the adaptation mechanism at the level of the cultural variables. 
4) What kind of informational mechanisms? 
The paper status that the considered anticipation mechanism is derived from a bounded rationality model 
without clearly explaining the nature of such model. 
5) Different types of authorities: what is the difference between them? 
In the paper is status that the decisional model is valid for the decisions adopted by formal public, semi-
public or private authorities. But it is very difficult to sustain the postulate of institutional aspects 
neutrality: the meta-framework of the social mandate implies the fact that different authorities have 
different specific mandate and so that different “utility function” at the base of their decisions. 
6) No connections between outputs and costs for different authorities: at what analytical price? 
For the sake of simplicity, there are not objective/subjective outputs and costs linkages between 
authority’s regulatory measures. It is not clearly in the advanced analysis how such a hypothesis affects 
the realism of the decisional models. This issue is particularly important since the IFRSs adoption process 
is a “multi-authority” one. 
7) What is specific for the national differences in the IFRSs adoption? 
There are quite few details about the intrinsic mechanisms of adopting / supervising / punishing the non-
follows of the regulations for IFRSs and is not very clearly if in fact all the required conditions implied 
by the global decisional framework are fulfilled in this particular case and even more there is not enough 
highlighted the decisional particularities. 
8) How are really influencing the cultural variables the dynamics of the social output? 
This paper claims that the cultural variables are influencing the output dynamics. But it could be easily 
observed the not enough developed analysis of the linkage between the cultural variables and the social 
transfers as a key factor of economic growth, the absence of any description of the possible 
“transmission” mechanism of the “institutional” and “behavioral” impact on the sustainable development 
as well as the absence of any EU case study particularity description as well as many others “blank” 
aspects. 
9) What means the “informational quality”? 
In the theoretical framework, the concept of “informational quality” is widely used in order to explain the 
impact of the regulatory status of financial information on the economic dynamics. But there is nowhere a 
clear definition on this concept which appears to be a “blank box”. 
10) What are in fact the connections between different findings? 
 The “predictions” from the previous section about the IFRSs impact on social output are based on 
different possible combinations between the C0 – C6 findings. But in fact no detailed mechanisms of the 
interactions mechanism inside of each combination are yet provided. 
 
3.2. Empirical estimation problems 
 
Not only the theoretical but also the empirical part of the paper is affected by imperfect clarifications. 
Some of them are connected with: 
° The stability of the regression models and the quality of the results (for instance, in terms of 
properties of the residuals variables); 
° The identification problems for the involved parameters; 
° The possible existence of non-linear interactions between the variables and the effects of such 
interactions; 
° The insufficient number of observation and the absence of an explanation for the composition of the 
samples; 
° The fact that the pool data are not constructed based on individual time-series so that there is no 
possibility for cross-section analysis, etc. 
 
Therefore, despite all these caveats, we argue that the paper could be seen as a small breakdown into a 
usual yet manner to deal with the decisional problems in general and with the IFRSs topic in particular 
like they are isolated for their “subjective” aspects. The human specie is not motivated in its fight for 
control over the natural and artificial environment only by “rational” motifs. Instead, the emotions could 
balance the logic and fear, solidarity, empathy and hope twins could shape the way in which people are 
doing business and are living together in the same social realm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX  
 
Table 1. The codification system for the domestic unlisted companies- the use of IFRSs (Consolidated 
financial statements - CFS; Individual financial statements - IFS) 
CFS IFS SCORE 
required required 2,00 
required permitted 1,75 
permitted required 1,75 
permitted permitted 1,50 
permitted prohibited 1,00 
prohibited permitted 1,00 
prohibited prohibited 0,00 
(Source: inspired by Use of IFRS by Jurisdiction updated at 11.01. 2008, www.iasplus.com; 
 accessed January 14, 2008) 
 
Table 2. The World Values Survey questions 
Code of 
Question 
Formulation Data represents 
A005 Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life-Work Very important 
A173 Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, 
while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to 
them. Please use this scale where 1 means "none at all" and 10 means "a great 
deal" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have 
over the way your life turns out. 
None at all 
C016 Here are some more aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look 
at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important in a job?-An 
opportunity to use initiative 
Not mentioned 
C034 How free are you to make decisions in your job? None at all 
C061 People have different ideas about following instructions at work. Some say that 
one should follow one's superior's instructions even when one does not fully 
agree with them. Others say that one should follow one's superior's instructions 
only when one is convinced that they are right. With which of these two 
opinions do you agree? 
Follow 
instructions 
F114 Tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. Claiming 
government benefits to which you are not entitled 
Never justifiable 
F116 Tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. Cheating 
on taxes if you have a chance 
Never justifiable 
F145 According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following?-Claiming 
state benefits to which they are 
Almost all 
F146 According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following?-Cheating 
on tax if they have the chance 
Almost all 
(Source: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/; 2008) 
 
Table 3: The countries cross section identifiers set 
Austria Denmark Germany Italy Netherlands Slovakia 
Belgium  Estonia Greece Latvia Poland Spain 
Bulgaria Finland Hungary Lithuania Portugal Sweden 
Czech Republic France Ireland Malta Romania United Kingdom 
 
Table 4: The general characteristics of the pool data for the score variable 
(Minimum – Min.; Maximum – Max.; Statistic – Sta.) 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Range Min. Max. Mean  Std. Variance Skewness  Kurtosis  
Sta.  Sta. Sta. Sta. Sta. Std. 
error 
Sta. Sta. Sta. Std. 
error 
Sta. Std. 
error 
Sc
or
e 
24 2.00 .00 2.00 1.2292 .09972 .48855 .239 -1.093 .472 1.873 .918 
 
One-Sample Test 
 Test Value = 0 
 95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
 
t Degree of 
freedom 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Score 12.326 23 .000 1.22917 1.0229 1.4355 
 
Table 5: Pooled One-Stage estimations for score variable 
Dependent Variable: Score variable Cross-sections included: 24 
Method: Pooled Least Squares Total pool (balanced) observations: 24 
Included observations: 1 White diagonal standard errors & covariance 
(degree of freedom. corrected) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
A005 0.020220 0.001988 10.17280 0.0000 
A173 0.284716 0.056652 5.025712 0.0000 
C016 0.020879 0.003045 6.855877 0.0000 
C034 0.080380 0.037177 2.162077 0.0413 
C061 0.037014 0.002730 13.55577 0.0000 
F114 0.019632 0.001458 13.46530 0.0000 
F116 0.022028 0.001598 13.78075 0.0000 
F145 0.040559 0.017313 2.342729 0.0282 
F146 0.044607 0.016425 2.715853 0.0123 
 
Table 6: Pooled One-Stage estimations for output 
Dependent Variable: 2001-2006 average real 
GDP growth 
Cross-sections included: 24 
Method: Pooled Least Squares Total pool (balanced) observations: 24 
Included observations: 1 White diagonal standard errors & covariance 
(degree of freedom. corrected) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Score variable 2.205980 0.378649 5.825917 0.0000 
A005 0.058733 0.009263 6.340836 0.0000 
A173 1.158734 0.159079 7.284036 0.0000 
C016 0.068561 0.008966 7.646994 0.0000 
C034 0.404220 0.064473 6.269601 0.0000 
C061 0.097876 0.015178 6.448497 0.0000 
F114 0.052601 0.009193 5.722116 0.0000 
F116 0.059662 0.009769 6.107195 0.0000 
F145 0.110572 0.046106 2.398236 0.0250 
F146 0.121409 0.044721 2.714811 0.0124 
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i Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. 
ii The adopted framework for the expectations derived from a bounded rationality approach in which the information 
is imperfect but is “completely” used by the social subjects. 
iii The description of the nature and the impact of such conditions exceed the analytical framework of the present 
paper. 
 
